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The mainstream of globalization and the state literature theorizes that state
capacity is undergoing a transformation; however, it has been unable to oper-
ationalize the dynamics of the change. This chapter attempts to address that
gap by exploring how states, which have been designed in reaction to the state-
centric system and its primary demand of survival at home and abroad,
respond to the pressures of globalization and localization.1 The conflictual core
of the transformation, therefore, is understood as occurring between the forces
of power maximization and centralization, and the accelerating forces for
power diffusion. To understand the transformation, we must ask: how is
national power/capacity reconfigured when faced with the power diffusion
impact of globalization and the power maximization demands of internal and
external security dilemmas?2
The primary determinants of the traditional state-centric international
system have been security concerns, both external and internal. These concerns
kept states largely occupied with geopolitics and anarchic conditions in their
immediate environments, as well as in the global system. In order to curb secu-
rity threats and maintain a constant position of readiness, the national forces
of a state had to be kept centralized and concentrated—though, of course, the
degree to which this was true varied according to the acuteness of the nation’s
conceptualization of security threats. To achieve centralized and thus maxi-
mized power, a ruling elite not only had to keep security issues and rhetoric
prominent on the public agenda, but it also had to seek to enhance the exist-
ing institutionalization of the security establishment. This process, which
could be labeled as securitization, is one through which everything becomes
linked to the idea of national security. National security becomes the primary
directive when assessing the feasibility of any major political project requiring
power reallocation at the national level. Ultimately, this led to the creation of
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security-oriented nation-states and, in extreme examples, to garrison states.
The power pattern, securitization process, and resulting state type are shown
in the first row of Figure 6.1.
The third row of Figure 6.1 outlines the new epoch of globalization. This
new epoch has enabled a mobility of resources, ideas, and individuals, and thus
empowered new actors above and below the state level. These new actors, with
their varied agendas, produce demands for a sharing of national power and a
consequent pressure for decentralization. The implication of this process in
terms of security, can be labeled as desecuritization. This term should not
imply an automatic minimizing of security issues, but rather a lowering of the
‘prime directive’ status of security over all other issues, and a reconsidering of
security as one of several major needs to be satisfied by national governance.
Achieving this involves increasing the transparency of and civilian control over
the determining of threats and the implementing of national security policies.
States that seem to be successfully managing this process can be identified as
Western or globalized states, such as those of Western Europe and North
America.
Many modernizing states3 in particular, however, seem to fall somewhere
in between these two worlds, as expressed by the middle row of the diagram.
As such, these states are forced to try and balance contradicting patterns of
power. The resulting conflictive process of power reconfiguration needs to be
further explored theoretically in order to project its possible implications.
THE GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE DEBATE
Hyperglobalists and Rejectionists
A first group of scholars, “hyperglobalists,” claim that globalization represents
a new epoch of human history in which traditional nation-states have become
unnatural or even impossible business units in the new global economy
(Albrow, 1997; Cox, 1997; Guéhenno, 1995; Luard, 1990; Ohmae, 1995;
Strange, 1996; Wriston, 1992). Based mostly on economic globalization, this
strand of the debate stresses the “denationalization” of national economics by
the powerful transnational networks of production, trade, and finance.
As opposed to the champions of globalization, its skeptics (e.g., Hall,
1996; Hirst, 1997; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1998) first make their
argument that globalization is not new by drawing on statistical findings on
world trade and on the level of economic interdependence in the nineteenth
century. They imply that state capacity survived those periods and was perhaps
even strengthened. They see intensification of interconnectedness as height-
ened levels of internationalization, which again emphasizes the key role of
national capacities. This line of argument essentially rejects the popular under-
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standing that the power of national governments is being undermined in the
current era by economic internationalization and global interconnectedness
(Krasner, 1993; 1995).
The Transformationalists
In between the total erosionist and statist arguments lies the transformation-
alist strand of thought regarding the fate of state capacity when confronted
with globalization. The transformationalist approach is by nature closer to that
of the hyperglobalizers than the rejectionists since it subscribes to the starting
conviction that in the new epoch globalization is a central driving force behind
the rapid social, political, and economic changes that are reshaping states, soci-
eties, and the world order (Giddens, 1990). According to this group of schol-
ars, globalization dynamics may not be new, but they are certainly existing at
unprecedented levels, and are creating a world of affairs in which no clear dis-
tinction exists between international and domestic lines to which every actor
in world affairs feels the need to adopt and adjust (Cammilleri & Falk, 1992;
Rosenau, 1990; Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996).
While the direction of the globalization impact is not fixed within the
transformationalist approach (Mann, 1997) and, therefore it does not include
claims about future trajectories of globalization and its impact, these scholars’
core emphasis is that globalization is a powerful transformative force that
introduces a “massive shake-out” for the subjects—including the states.
The transformationalists’ main argument regarding state capacity is that
contemporary globalization is reconstituting and reengineering the nature and
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Pattern of Resulting State State
Power Power Agenda Type
State-Centric Power Securitization Security-
world/security maximization oriented nation-
dilemmas centralization state
Modernizing Turbulent Conflictive power Torn state
world balancing of reconfiguration
the two
Multicentric Power diffusion/ Desecuritization Western/
world decentralization globalized
globalization
FIGURE 6.1. A Taxonomy of State Power Configurations in the Modernizing World
configurations of national governments. This argument does not claim that
the territorial frontiers have no political or military significance, but rather it
accepts that these issues have become increasingly challenged in an era of
intensified globalization. The major basis for this conviction is that the world
is not just state-centric or only state governed. Rather, as authority becomes
diffused among public and private agencies at the local, national, regional, and
global levels, nation-states are not the principal form of authority in the world
(Rosenau, 1997).
States and national governments, being subject to these pressures, devise
strategies to adapt to the new conditions. Distinctive strategies lead to differ-
ent forms of states—from the neoliberal minimal state to varying types of
developmental states to the “catalytic” state, in which the government is a facil-
itator of coordinated and collective action. What is proposed here, therefore, is
that states adapt and transform to become more activist in determining their
destinies (Rosenau, 1997).
There are several arguments why the transformationalist approach is the
most appropriate to explain the dynamics of current world affairs. First, the
hyperglobalist argument that a perfectly competitive global economy is emerg-
ing (or has already emerged) is an unlikely assumption since we have yet to
achieve perfect national economies. In other words, a fully integrated global
market with a minimized, if not completely diminished role for states, does not
represent the true nature of the new epoch.
The rejectionist approach also has shortcomings. The empirical evidence
on which this approach relies can easily be interpreted differently. For exam-
ple, even if the trade/GDP ratios in the 1890s were higher than the ones in
the 1990s, this reveals little about the social and political transformations to
which this trade led. To draw an analogy, Chinese speakers may constitute a
larger number worldwide than English speakers, but this does not make Chi-
nese a global language (Held & McGrew, 1993). It is clear that the expanding
liberal economy is also attached to the expansion of liberal democracy, which
implies that the qualitative implications of these transformations must be
studied in order to understand the phenomenon better.
As opposed to these two approaches, the transformationalist understand-
ing does not see any fixed future in the globalization debate. There is neither
a perfect global economy nor state-system dominated global changes. More-
over, contrary to the hyperglobalists and rejectionists, the transformationalists
do not see globalization as a singular process (economic or cultural) or as a
linear movement to a known destiny. The dynamics of globalization may
include progress as well as retreat and reversals, and they can happen in very
different ways in all major areas of life, including political, military, environ-
mental, or public policy. Most important, integration and fragmentation,
convergence and divergence, can all occur simultaneously in a highly intercon-
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nected manner, so that states, in particular, will have to find their way in adapt-
ing not only to globalization but to “fragmegration.”
In addition to the previous arguments, the diversity of state types and of
capacity levels in current world affairs requires a flexible approach, one that
emphasizes the differentiated processes that are also influenced by other real-
ities of life, such as security. The transformationalist approach is particularly
suited for a study that is concerned with states of the modernizing world since
the states and national capacities in this realm seem to be the most in trans-
formation and also the most entrapped between the new world and the tradi-
tional one. The vast spectrum of the degree of development in these states is
also an indication of transformation and of being subject to fragmegration.
Has the transformationalist approach achieved all that it could to explain
the transformation of the state within fragmegration/globalization? The
answer, quite simply, is no. Perhaps because they have been occupied within
the debate by establishing their strand of the argument, but most scholars have
tried to establish the approach in their work rather than to operationalize it.
We are left still not knowing how the transformation actually occurs. We now
know that there are different types of states—for example, neoliberal or devel-
opmental—we now know even that we can label different nation-states as
security states, sovereign states, or democratic states, which are most of the
time intertwined and overlapped (Clark, 1999). What we do not know is how
these different characteristics of state identity and capacity coexist or compete
and, most important, how they transform from one to the other. This leads to
the core inquiry of this chapter: the dynamics of the transformation of the state
capacity and identity at the domestic level.
What, then, are these important transnational phenomena that are sub-
jecting state power to both integration and fragmentation and therefore impos-
ing a need to transform its structure in order to better adapt? In the current age
and for most modernizing world states, these phenomena are political global-
ization’s reforming impact and the resilient forces of traditional security dilem-
mas. These two elements are particularly crucial to analyze since their ultimate
impact is about national power—whether they are forcing it to diffuse or to
maximize, to decentralize or centralize. Once the national power configurations
and the nature of a state have been changed, one can then truly talk about a
transformation of state identity and capacity and of global transformation.
The Modernizing World
The so-called modernizing world is considered here as largely synonymous
with the democratizing world since political globalization (i.e., pressure for
democratization and liberalization) is one of the starting points for my
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arguments. The idea of a “democratizing world” stems from the postulation
that the world political system can be divided into two or more spheres in
which the rules of the game as well as the types and natures of the actors may
differ from each other. By making such categorizations, we not only can pres-
ent a more accurate picture of reality but can also provide a more convenient
base for intellectual exercise to describe, explain, and possibly predict the
external and domestic dynamics within these spheres (for similar views, see
Ayoob, 1995, and Buzan, 1998).
A further and equally important advantage of such a classification is to
help tackle better the problem of broad but unjustified definitions of the
developing world. Since the end of the Cold War, the Second World is con-
sidered to have disappeared. Its subsequent incorporation into the traditional
Third World exacerbated the problem of definition by widening the already
existing degree of variation and diversity.
One common concept in the classifications of world political systems is
the type and nature of the unit actor: the state. The concept of the state war-
rants further elaboration since a state-based classification scheme is another
starting point of this inquiry. Since democratization as a way of responding to
political globalization is another variable, not only the type of the state but the
degree of its political development is also important for this research. This
means determining how the relationship between the state and the society is
structured; in other words, how are “power” and “consent” mixed? This ques-
tion is significant because this domestic characteristic, which was emphasized
by Hobbes and Machiavelli, has a strong role in the interrelationships between
unit level factors and global processes (William, 1996). This link is also impor-
tant when categorizing world spheres according to the type of the states
because the management of power without the exercise of force has become
the true measure of states’ political capacity ( Jackman, 1996).
The assumption here is that modernizing world states are not fundamen-
tally different from Western ones (since we at least know that they want to
progress into a similar ‘successful’ structure—the common nation-state) rather,
they are located at different stages of a developmental process (Buzan, 1991).
The criteria, therefore, for the differentiation is the level of development
toward modern statehood. In terms of this research, the measurement of these
criteria could be seen as the degree of ability to balance the needs of effective-
ness (power) and consent (legitimacy).
Within this measurement, one could conceive of the world political
system as follows: in the first sphere, also known as the core, the state is pow-
erful enough to exercise force to gain consent, but does not and can not, due
to the level of accountability it is subject to from society. What we have is a
state that is weak in terms of accountability to society, and a society strong
enough to exercise considerable power over its state. This category is similar to
what Buzan and Segal (1996, 1998) or Sørensen (this volume) label the post-
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modern state, which has a much more tolerant attitude toward cultural, eco-
nomic, and political interaction, and define[s] a much narrower range of things
as threats to national security. In the postmodern state ‘civil society’ has, in a
sense, more influence than the government—fitting with the criterion of high
degree of accountability of the state to society.
This categorization also resembles somewhat Holm and Sørensen’s (1995)
“operational sovereignty,” which refers to limits on sovereignty that states
choose to place on themselves. In other words, state control over institutional
or issue domains that they are willing to give up or trade in return for greater
influence at the system level. If a state is currently in a strong position or if it
carefully uses its bargaining power, it may be able to influence
decisions/changes/trends at the system level.
At the opposite end of the spectrum it is difficult to speak of any type of
accountability due to the poorly developed political entities and incoherent
(sociologically and politically) societies. In these units, the state is so prema-
ture that, even if it wanted, it would not be able to use force to gain consent.
This is also due to the level of fragmentation in the society. What we have in
this sphere is a weak state and fragmented society (Ayoob, 1995). This is sim-
ilar to what Buzan calls a premodern state, or what Holm and Sørensen refer
to as negative sovereignty. While such a state may aspire to becoming a
modern state, it is prevented by the weakness at both the political and societal
levels. With essentially no room for a wide sense of accountability, there is
more of an anarchy than a hierarchy within the state. Some examples of such
states are located primarily in Africa and Central Asia (e.g., Afghanistan, Tad-
jikistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire; Buzan, 1998).
In between these two groups is the third type of state in which the bal-
ance between effectiveness and consent/legitimacy is still biased toward effec-
tiveness/power. In other words, the state and the representative governments
continue to enjoy strong prerogatives, either constitutionally or not, and are
able to use force to gain the necessary consent from society—a strong state and
weak/fragmented society in which the state and power-holders are not highly
accountable to society. Although there is some accountability, it is between
weak political figures—for example, the products of imperfect elections—and
society. The state itself is not accountable in a number of domains.
This is similar to what Buzan labels a modern state, or Holm and
Sørensen categorize as a positive sovereignty. Such a state desires to become a
postmodern one, but has not yet been able to overcome the improper account-
ability problem. According to Buzan, the major characteristics of this type of
state is the “strong government control over society” (1998: 221). He adds that
these modern states typically define a wide range of military, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural factors as threats to national security. The aspirations of
these states are not only to become postmodern states but also, and more
important, to become great powers, or at least regional hegemons. Some
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examples he cites are Iran, Iraq, Russia, China, India, Turkey, and the two
Koreas. These status-related intentions, combined with other unit and system-
level sources, increase a high degree of vulnerability and pressure for the unit
actors and their policies. Basically, in the regions in which these states are
located, and the international relations in which they take part, classical real-
ist rules remain valid since armed conflicts are still applicable as policy options.
DYNAMICS OF THE TRANSFORMATION
The nature of power in security-oriented nation-states has been based on the
idea of power maximization through power centralization. State security
bureaucracies grew ever larger during the centralization process, primarily at
the expense of a societal role or input. The primacy of state interests and
national security reached such a level in some cases that these states can be
argued to have become in fact giant security apparatuses, which possessed
nations and societies. Thus, a model of a strong state and correspondingly
weak society emerged. Global democratization and liberalization waves have
targeted this particular state/society relationship by promoting, if not provok-
ing, more societal input in the national governance. Nevertheless, the primacy
of national security and the consequent steady securitization of the public
agenda by these security apparatuses have been trying to resist against these
powerful global liberalizing dynamics.
Due in part to its own internal inefficiencies and as well to the increas-
ingly irresistible attractiveness of global liberalization dynamics, the lowering
of the perceived levels of international anarchy and its accompanying vulnera-
bility put the strong state/suppressed society structure to a serious test. Secu-
ritization of the public agenda has become much more difficult in these
governance structures.
As long as securitization of the public agenda and the consequent alloca-
tion of material and psychological national resources remained relatively
unquestioned, strong states were able to keep the society and its potential haz-
ards under control. The primacy of national security and the exaggerated char-
acterization of vaguely defined internal and external enemies and threats
rendered the fragmented societal structure and its potential demands less rel-
evant and urgent. Therefore, a strong state-fragmented society relationship
was able to endure.
One of the major problems of the seeming resistance of the strong state-
fragmented society model was that the fragmented nature of the society and
its potential demands were only curtailed, but did not necessarily transform in
a manner the state elite would like to portray to the outside world or even to
their own domestic public opinion. The state elite, and in particular the giant
security apparatuses, knew of the potential societal threats, and calculated for
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them as a part of the larger security dilemmas they perceived for their states.
These considerations, however, viewed these domestic vulnerabilities as poten-
tial weak points that might be manipulated by others during the anarchic
geopolitical atmosphere between nation-states. Such an understanding pro-
vided not only additional bases for the primacy of national security over other
domestic public agendas, but also further provoked power centralization at the
national level in order to weaken those fragmented societal elements deemed
threatening. Most states with such governance structures appeared on the sur-
face as relatively stable nation-states who were prepared to play by the rules of
the realist anarchic world. In these states, certain types of gradual and carefully
supervised modernization projects were implemented, also in an effort to min-
imize outside impact and thereby remaining national and protectionist.
In this overall picture, the strong state (centralized power) was the best
possible response not only to handle external threats and security dilemmas,
but also to cope with potential problems stemming from the fragmented
nature of the societies. Relentless securitization was the order of the day.
SECURITY VERSUS LIBERALIZATION
The emergence of the multicentric world, the significant rise in global liberal-
ization (hereafter, political globalization) forces, and most important, the end
of the Cold War and the impact this had on reducing the perception of exter-
nal threats, have led to an environment in which, for many of the moderniz-
ing world states, the primary security agendas of the previous world order have
become less able to function as determining instruments of public life. First, a
general need for some kind of change—most often toward a more democratic
form of state/society relations—now appears inevitable and unavoidable.
Second, the capacity of security apparatuses to use external threat calculations
for domestic securitization has shrunk. Large, strong security apparatuses no
longer seem to have a definitive mission, and, moreover, societal interpreta-
tions of Western liberal democracies do not look favorably on large roles for
states and security apparatuses. The strong state, therefore, is feeling not only
systematic pressure from the external and internal environment to downsize
and share some of its power or halt some of its functions, but is also facing a
society that is more actively demanding a share from the centralized power
structure. The weakening process of the strong centralized state has been put
into action. Fragmented societal elements can no longer be considered merely
potential challenges to national security; these potential threats are already
politicized and empowered by economic globalization and are beginning to
corner the state power structure.
What does a centralized state structure do to respond to such power
demands? One can anticipate first an immediate reflexive move by elites to try
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and hold on to their already established prerogatives in the name of stability
and the survival of the state. Although this point is important since it can
freeze or delay the budding power struggle for an uncertain period, it can ulti-
mately be overcome when the sitting elites or administrators are replaced.
Thus, some form of inevitable transformation will occur.
There is more to the story, however, than just power-holding elites resist-
ing domestic power reconfiguration. Though designed to in fact overreact to
security issues, the existing state structure now must find a way to, at minimum,
preserve its centralized/maximized power structure in order to cope with the
combined remaining amount of perceived external threats and the resurfacing
of formerly suppressed domestic threats, such as power demands and poten-
tially even secessionist efforts of segments of their fragmented societies.
Ideally, a centralized domestic governance structure should adapt to a
decentralized power structure, perhaps even taking on a managerial or supervi-
sory role in the transition process. However, most developing world state secu-
rity apparatuses do not know how to adapt due to their inherent nature of
overreacting to frightening situations of instability. Rather than an ideal
response of decentralizing and downsizing while simultaneously maximizing its
effectiveness for meeting new security challenges, the strong state structure
reacts in its traditional manner of trying to even further maximize and central-
ize the power configuration at the national level. It is difficult to find an exam-
ple of an old-world state structure (i.e., garrison states or a variant thereof ) with
the potential for such a rapid adaptation and transformation process. This is
especially true because this new threat demands an immediate securing of the
conflictive transformation process to avoid dangerous domestic instability.















FIGURE 6.2. Locating the Torn States Along the Power Configuration Line
There is not sufficient time, therefore, for the nation-state as a whole to produce
a new, sophisticated functioning power structure to meet this new challenge.
Thus, security versus liberalization becomes the primary impasse faced by
the national governance structure. The state is pressured by power diffusion
dynamics that cannot be dismissed, yet there remains the need to preserve if
not maximize its power at a time of (over)perceived insecurities. The position
of such torn states is expressed in Figure 6.2, which is, in a sense, a dynamic
representation of the middle row of the taxonomy in Figure 6.1. Can the nec-
essary transformation for these states occur in a peaceful manner? In the course
of such a transformation over issues of power, and in the absence of an overar-
ching agency to manage this tumultuous process, the answer seems to be no.
The dynamics of this new security dilemma will be even more acute in those
countries in which societal fragmentation levels need significant time to
develop cohesive national understandings and structures.
HYPOTHESIZING ON TORN STATE TRANSFORMATIONS
Bifurcation of the National Agenda
The taxonomy and discussion in this chapter suggest certain outcomes that we
might expect of such a torn state structure, both at the macro and micro levels,
and which can now be used to project certain implications. If power maxi-
mization leads to an agenda of securitization, and power diffusion leads to one
of desecuritization, then the existence of both forces could lead to a bifurca-
tion of the national agenda into two parts—one belonging to a relatively
closed realm that might be labeled as hard politics and include issues such as
state unity, sovereignty, geopolitical concerns, foreign policy, and domestic and
external security issues. This realm would presumably be controlled by conser-
vative security elite/bureaucrats, and nationalists among the public officials.
The second half of the agenda, belonging to a relatively more open realm,
might be labeled soft politics, and may include issues such as economic and
political liberalization, and domestic links to global elements such as civil soci-
ety and human rights groups. This realm would likely be run by, for example,
political parties, the liberal elite, intellectuals, and the newly emerging, glob-
ally linked NGOs.
Duality in Governance
A bifurcation of the national agenda, depending on the context, that is, the
level and length of exposure to either or both of the external pressures, the
particular qualities of the leadership, or the possible existence and strength of
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coalitions, may lead over time to a dual institutionalization of the two politi-
cal realms. Since the powerful security-minded elite cannot ignore the politi-
cal globalization impact due to international legitimacy needs and other
factors such as IMF financial aid and often embedded modernization drives
from within, they can be expected to allow the soft politics realm of civilian
governments and political parties to expand—as long as it does not intervene
in the hard politics realm. In the extreme case this might be anticipated to lead
to a duality in the domestic governance structure that could be deconstructed
as an inner state and an apparent state. While the former would remain to
respond to the state-centric world demands, the latter would exist to meet
increasing globalization pressures.
Increasing State/Society Conflict and 
Resulting Chronic Governance Crises
One might anticipate certain implications of such a state structure on the level
of stability at both the domestic and regional levels. With power relocation and
resistance to it remaining the main ingredient of the domestic level agenda,
repression and counterinsurgencies would be expected to occur, leading to
bumpy transitions to democracy and conflictual domestic settings.
One of globalization’s indirect pressures on the modernizing state comes
about with the empowering of society in the sense that deepening political
globalization can be considered as greater democratization and thus more
input from society. Given that in the modernizing countries relevant to this
discussion, the state is the existing power center, any empowerment of some
other element logically means a reduction or compromising of the state’s
power—a situation bound to lead to conflict between the two. This con-
frontational positioning of the state and the societal masses may mean a base
for indefinite domestic instability and authority crises in political affairs.
Reemphasizing the Primacy of Internal Threats
An additional projection that can emerge from this research is evidence reem-
phasizing the primacy of internal security over external security in parts of the
modernizing world. This does not mean that these countries are no longer
concerned with external security threats. It also does not deny that internal
threats are still partly of concern due to their external connections, that is, such
threats cause instability and weakness that can be taken advantage of by exter-
nal rivals and thereby weaken the country within the regional balance of
power. However, the research does suggest that internal threat perceptions
themselves are becoming more salient in provoking power centralization
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needs. In other words, the safety of the inevitable transformation is viewed as
being most vulnerable to domestic challenges. As such, survival at home can
be seen as almost a prerequisite even for just being an actor in the international
system, let alone for playing power politics at the international level.
The New Security Dilemma
Research projects that transformation from more centralized to more diffused
state structures is inevitable in the new era. If it is inevitable, it must therefore
be managed. Maintaining the stability of this unavoidable transformation
when there is a simultaneous combining of power centralization and power
diffusion demands can be considered as the source for a new security dilemma
facing the state types under discussion in this chapter. In the process of man-
aging this transformation, states must find a balance between the two pressures
in which, first, neither influence is excluded to a point that it jeopardizes the
stable transformation, and, second, the balance is maintained at a level at
which the dynamism of the progress continues.
Once the powerful elite feels that the process of desecuritization has the
potential of allowing instability to rise, the basic instinct remains to centralize
power in order to most efficiently face these possible challenges. These elite’s
past practices and experiences of anarchical world understandings, along with
existing ‘realities’ of geopolitical calculations, further facilitate power central-
ization instincts. If these instincts are materialized, however, the result is
bound to clash with the power diffusion requirements of the current era. This
clash, therefore, constitutes the new security dilemma with which moderniz-
ing world states must cope.
Since the power-holding elite in these states traditionally know how to
manage power centralization, the emphasis in dealing with this transformation
is understandably on how to manage the power decentralization/diffusion that
the new epoch requires. Since power centralization in these countries was tra-
ditionally carried out through a securitization process—relying on security’s
primary role in public life—decentralization can generally be equated with
desecuritization. The challenge becomes one of managing and stabilizing the
desecuritization process without damaging the traditional mechanisms of
power centralization and thus one’s sense of national security in a particular
country’s context.
Conclusion
The preceding theoretical analysis and implications suggest that the dualistic
(state-centric and multicentric) structure of the international system generates
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certain inevitable transformations between the major forces of these world
perspectives. It also suggests that these transformations lead to a type of torn
governance structure at the national level. Such potentially unstable yet
inevitable transformative processes appear as the major source for the new
security dilemmas that these modernizing states face, due to the contradictory
instincts of power centralization and power diffusion.
Providing concrete evidence of such turbulent transformations and duali-
ties out of real-life experiences was beyond the scope of this chapter. Future
case studies must therefore be conducted to explore in depth the internal
nature of this new security dilemma and resulting institutional responses to it.
Several countries appear to be facing this dilemma of conflicting globalization
and security pressures, such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran. To accomplish
this task effectively, and reveal the secrecies of the black box of the state in
transformation, any research of this type must cross disciplinary boundaries
between, at minimum, international and comparative politics. At a time when
physical borders are reputedly becoming more transient, conceptual bound-
aries must be at least equally so for a fair reflection of reality.
NOTES
1. These two forces and their corresponding pressures of fragmentation and
integration have been suggested to express the transformative dynamics of a new era in
world politics—one labeled fragmegration (Rosenau, 1997). This chapter focuses on
pressures of globalization since they promote the potential for power diffusion and
relocation. Localization pressures such as ethnic or nationalist unrest, on the other
hand, may actually increase a state’s security relevance, and not disturb the accordingly
designed state power structure.
2. While various forms of globalization have been identified (Held et al.,
1999), this research refers primarily to globalization in its political form. Political
globalization is understood here as a consensus on the combined ideas of economic
liberalism and liberal democracy and the pressure this creates on states for further
democratization and liberalization, which in turn necessitate a diffusion of national
power. Focusing on this aspect of globalization is crucial because it is the liberalization
impact of political globalization in particular that leads to a reconfiguration of state
power structures. Power maximization and centralization may, at least initially, coexist
with, for example, economic globalization and liberalization—as evidenced by existing
nondemocratic regimes with relatively liberal economies—but is incompatible with
political globalization and liberalization pressure. Security dilemmas in the moderniz-
ing world are seen as based not only on external vulnerabilities, but also on domestic
ones such as regime insecurity issues. This means that traditional states of the mod-
ernizing world have to protect themselves from both an external anarchy and an
increasing internal one.
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3. The modernizing world of Figure 6.1 refers here to those states of the devel-
oping world that have long-standing strong state traditions, a history of aspiring to
modernize, and are highly concerned with traditional security dilemmas. Examples of
such states can be as diverse as China, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Iran, to name a
few. The definition is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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